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Parliaments in Security Policy: Involvement, Politicisation, and Influence 
 
Patrick A. Mello and Dirk Peters 
 
Abstract 
While parliaments have long been neglected actors in the analysis of security policy, recent 
studies indicate a slowly growing research literature on the subject. This introduction to a 
special issue on parliaments in security policy critically reviews this literature. It argues that 
current research is focused primarily on how parliaments, relying on formal legal competences, 
can constrain governmental policies and that this research needs expansion in three areas. First, 
informal sources of parliamentary influence on security policy deserve more systematic 
attention as the significance of parliaments in concrete cases often hinges on contextual factors 
and individual decision-makers. Secondly, we still lack a systematic understanding of the 
effects of parliamentary involvement on security policy and especially broader patterns that 
would be discernible across a wider variety of countries and policies. Finally, the role of 
parliaments for the politics of security is almost completely uncharted territory so far. When 
parliaments become involved in security policy, does this foster transparency and contribute to 
the politicization of security policy so that security policy becomes a “normal” political issue? 
The article reviews current research, derives findings from the contributions to this special 
issue, and spells out their wider implications for the study of domestic politics and international 
relations, before concluding with some avenues for future research. 
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Introduction: Parliaments in Security Policy – Why Bother?  
Parliament is the pivotal democratic institution. Yet, despite a large body of research on the 
democratic peace and the significance of democracy for security policy – and an equally sized 
literature on legislatures – the relationship between parliaments and security policy is not well 
understood.1 Research on the democratic peace has established that a linkage exists between 
shared democracy inside states and peaceful relations between them. While democracies are as 
war-prone as non-democracies, there are almost no wars between consolidated democracies. 
According to an influential explanation for the democratic peace, democratic institutions play 
a causal role in the process of interdemocratic peace because they help to transmit the 
preferences of a war-averse population into government policies. Against this backdrop, it is 
surprising that the role of parliaments for the formulation and implementation of security policy 
has received scant attention in previous studies. Regardless of the type of democracy, 
parliaments constitute a highly significant representative institution and take a central place in 
the polity, in which public debate and decision-making about political rules are integrated. If 
the key mechanism for the democratic peace is that governments need to consider the 
preferences of the population, parliaments will play an important role in that mechanism, 
representing and articulating preferences of the electorate. 
Likewise, comparative research on parliaments has paid little attention to the role that 
parliaments have in security and remained largely focused on their legislative functions, matters 
of domestic policy, or their role in democratization processes. In a recent handbook on 
legislative studies (Martin, et al., 2014) only a single chapter addresses foreign policy broadly 
conceived (Raunio, 2014). Others examine whether parliament wields a formal constitutional 
right to declare war and take this as an indicator of parliamentary influence on security policy 
(Fish and Kroenig, 2009). However, in an age where declarations of war are obsolescent, this 
measure has become virtually meaningless.  
The lack of interest in parliaments’ role in security reflects a traditional view that regards 
parliaments as inconsequential actors in this policy field and their involvement in decision-
making as inappropriate or unnecessary for several reasons. Public debate of security matters 
is considered inadequate due to requirements of secrecy, parliamentary procedures are seen as 
too cumbersome for security policy where swift decisions are warranted, and foreign and 
security policy is assumed to be of less concern to citizens than domestic politics (Raunio 2014: 
543).  
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As we will show below, this view has become less convincing after the end of the Cold War 
and meanwhile a growing literature has started to address the role of parliaments in the security 
realm (Dieterich et al., 2015; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Ku and Jacobson, 2003; Mello, 2012; 
Peters and Wagner, 2014; Raunio and Wagner, 2017).2 The present special issue is both an 
indicator of and a contribution to this change in the literature. We argue that this research, 
despite needs for further refinement, holds promise to surpass the narrow concerns of specific 
fields and equally contribute to international relations (IR) theory, foreign policy analysis, 
legislative studies, and democratic theory by exploring a neglected aspect of the interplay 
between domestic and international politics. For IR and the study of international peace and 
conflict, it contributes to a clearer understanding of the contribution that domestic institutions 
make to the use of force by democracies. The same holds for foreign policy analysis which has 
been predominantly occupied with the role of the executive in foreign policy decision-making. 
For comparative politics and legislative studies, it presents an opportunity to test the 
generalizability of their insights about the workings of parliamentary institutions beyond the 
legislative realm. Democratic theory has intensively studied general questions of political 
representation and accountability but seldom focused on the role that legislatures can play for 
the democratic legitimation of security policy.  
However, to realize its potential this emerging field needs further development. We suggest 
three areas that deserve particular attention. First, there is a lack of studies that explore the 
informal sources of opportunities for parliamentary influence on security policy. As we will 
show below, research has focused on how the relations between parliaments and executives are 
formally structured and the past years have brought significant progress in our knowledge about 
this issue. Case studies, however, suggest that the significance of parliaments in concrete cases 
often hinges not only on the extent of their formal authority but on how the interaction with the 
executive plays out within this setting. Moreover, situational factors and how individual actors 
manage legislative-executive relations in the case at hand often appear to be of high 
significance, but they have rarely been studied in detail. 
Secondly, we still lack a systematic understanding of the effect of parliamentary involvement 
on security policy. While there are studies of how parliamentary involvement affected the 
participation of countries in individual multinational military operations, broader patterns that 
would be discernible across a wider variety of countries and policies have not yet been 
conducted. But it is such patterns that are of crucial importance for establishing the link between 
domestic representative institutions and the conflict behaviour of democracies. What is the 
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evidence for the existence of a “parliamentary peace” (Dieterich, et al., 2015) beyond the case 
of the Iraq war and a specific subset of countries? And are there discernible effects of 
parliamentary involvement on media scrutiny, public opinion, and elite consensus? 
Thirdly, the role of parliaments for the politics of security is almost completely uncharted 
territory so far. This is somewhat surprising. From the viewpoint of democratic theory, it is a 
primary contribution of parliaments to democracy that they not only constrain the executive 
and hold it to account; but that they foster public debate before decisions are made. 
Parliamentary involvement challenges many traditional assumptions about security as an issue 
area that is characterized by secrecy and a unified interest in national security. When 
parliaments become involved in security policy – does this foster transparency and contribute 
to the politicization of security policy so that security policy becomes a “normal” political 
issue? 
In this article, we first review current research on the role of parliaments in security policy. Our 
focus in this introduction – and the general focus of the special issue as a whole – rests primarily 
on “hard” security issues related to war involvement, military operations, and the use of force.3 
This contrasts with broader perspectives on parliaments’ place in foreign and security policy 
(for instance, see  Raunio and Wagner, 2017). Based on our review of the literature, we then 
discuss existing blind spots and consider how addressing them would strengthen research at the 
intersection of IR and comparative politics more generally. Finally, we outline the contribution 
of this special issue and its individual articles to this endeavour before concluding with some 
avenues for future research. 
Current Research and Its Focus on Formal Legislative-Executive Relations 
For a long time, the study of the role of legislatures in security policy has focused almost 
exclusively on the US Congress. There is an established and still growing literature on the 
relationship between Congress and the Presidency over matters of foreign and security policy, 
particularly in the field of war powers (Auerswald and Cowhey, 1997; Böller, 2015; Fowler, 
2015; Glennon, 2003; Grimmett, 2001; Hallett, 1998, 2012; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005, 
2007; Scott and Carter, 2014; Zeisberg, 2013). Outside the US context, this field has gained 
traction only more recently, coinciding with a growing political interest in involving 
parliaments in matters of security policy after the Cold War.  
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The reasons for the increased attention lay in two developments. For one, the waning Cold War 
confrontation between East and West and the increasing prominence of robust peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, and military interventions in foreign conflicts made the deployment of 
troops for many states a matter of voluntary political choice rather than a defensive necessity. 
This put two questions on the agenda: how to make deployment decisions and which political 
actors to involve in them? Secondly, the democratization of formerly authoritarian states in 
Central and Eastern Europe sparked debates about the proper role of parliament in policy-
making there, including matters of foreign and security policy. Many transition countries, 
including Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, initially established firm parliamentary rights in 
security matters, only to curb these regulations during their NATO accession processes in the 
early 2000s (Cottey et al., 2002; Wagner et al., 2010). All of this led also to an increasing 
interest of researchers in the role that parliaments play when governments send troops abroad, 
and in democratic security policy more generally (Dieterich, et al., 2015; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 
2010; Ostermann, 2017; Peters and Wagner, 2011; Strong, 2015b). 
Most of these studies, both on US Congress and European parliaments, have centered on one 
key issue: the significance of parliaments as actors seeking to influence governments. Can 
parliaments constrain government in matters of security policy, especially when it comes to the 
deployment of armed forces? And, if so, under which circumstances can they become 
influential? This research has come up with two factors which are particularly important in 
shaping relations between parliaments and governments in this issue area: constitutional rules 
and the party composition of parliament. We will address these in turn and also briefly discuss 
how this research has relied on a rather narrow methodological toolset so far. 
 
Constitutional rules and the role of parliament in sending troops abroad 
A considerable amount of research went into how constitutional or legal rules affect the ability 
of parliaments to constrain or influence governments. From this research, it has become clear 
that parliaments around the world are equipped with a highly diverse set of formal competences 
in the security field. Parliament’s authority to veto troop deployments is certainly the most 
prominent among these competences. A considerable number of parliaments in democracies 
across the globe (roughly a third of them) possess the constitutional right to veto troop 
deployments (Wagner, et al., 2010). But studies have shown that this veto right is only one 
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aspect of a highly differentiated set of competences that parliaments can possess and that there 
is “a trend towards ever more differentiation” (Peters and Wagner, 2011: 187).  
In fact, even the veto right itself is not a uniform phenomenon. Where it exists at all, it usually 
does not cover all potential deployments. Rather, it encompasses only certain types of 
operations, depending on their size, their goals, or the international organization under whose 
mandate they are carried out. Moreover, the right is not always exercised by the entire plenary 
but by specialized parliamentary committees. For instance, Austria delegates parliamentary 
votes on military deployments to a committee with 32 members, Bulgaria exempts NATO and 
EU-led operations from mandatory parliamentary approval, and Germany does not require ex 
ante parliamentary votes on humanitarian and non-offensive operations, although this is 
interpreted restrictively (Peters and Wagner, 2011; Wagner, et al., 2010). At the same time, it 
is important to note that the absence of a veto right does not imply that parliament has no formal 
competences when the executive plans to send troops abroad. Parliaments can, for instance, 
enjoy the right to be informed before troops are deployed and thus make their positions heard 
even if they are not allowed to co-decide on the issue. In response to these complexities, 
Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2010) have developed a fine-grained classification of 
parliamentary “war powers”, which does not only include parliament’s participation in 
decision-making on military deployments but also its control resources during an operation, its 
ability to publicly debate operations, and its ability to remove actors responsible for military 
operations from office.  
Classifications of parliamentary competences have been used to account for decisions on war 
involvement in individual conflicts (Dieterich, et al., 2015; Haesebrouck, 2016; Mello, 2014). 
These studies found that parliamentary competences alone do not suffice to explain 
government’s propensity to deploy troops but that interactions with other factors need to be 
considered, especially with public opinion and with the partisan composition of parliament and 
government. 
Party politics and the role of parliaments in security 
The party composition of parliament has become a second intensely studied factor affecting 
parliament’s position vis-à-vis government (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Huff, 2015; Kesgin 
and Kaarbo, 2010; Mello, 2012; Schuster and Maier, 2006; Wagner et al., 2017). Having no 
own parliamentary majority makes it difficult for governments, even in presidential systems, to 
 
 
6
send troops abroad. Howell and Pevehouse (2007) demonstrate that partisan congruence 
between the White House and Congress affects the frequency with which troops are sent abroad. 
But even single-party majority governments can be challenged by parliament if there are 
intraparty divisions concerning a proposed policy, as Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) show for the 
case of Turkey. In a similar vein, Huff (2015) argues that both intra-party coherence and 
polarization between parties (in addition to parliamentary culture and the political salience of 
an issue) matter for the intensity with which member state parliamentarians scrutinize the EU’s 
security policy. Moreover, there are indications that the left-right spectrum matters for the 
support that government can expect for military deployments. Parties towards the center and 
the center-right are most willing to support deployments. Moreover, leftist parties, by-and-
large, appear to be more interested in parliamentary scrutiny than parties on the right (Wagner, 
et al., 2017). Mello (2012; 2014) finds indications for the interaction between formal 
institutional constraints, the party-political composition of government and parliament, and 
military participation in the Iraq War.  
While there is strong evidence, therefore, that party politics matter for whether parliamentarians 
will seek to interfere with governmental policy, we still lack a coherent understanding of the 
circumstances under which it plays out. The significance of the left-right spectrum and of a 
governmental majority suggests especially interesting questions for the study of parliamentary 
politics when coalition governments seek to send troops abroad or implement security policy, 
e.g. when governments enjoy a parliamentary majority but are comprised of parties with 
diverging preferences (in this special issue, see Oktay, 2018). 
Methodological issues 
Research on parliaments in security policy is a relatively new and still emerging field. This is 
also visible in the restricted set of methods that are currently being applied there. Typically, 
studies focus either on exploring parliament’s role in an individual country or they compare a 
small number of countries with respect to a small number of operations. While this is helpful 
for gathering evidence in a new field it also restricts the scope of the conclusions that can be 
drawn. 
This is reinforced by two other methodological limitations of the field at present. For one, key 
concepts are defined and operationalized in different ways in different studies. There exist, for 
example, different conceptions of parliamentary competences, or “war powers”. While a 
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consensus has emerged that a parliamentary veto over troop deployments should somehow 
figure in an operationalization of war powers, studies either restrict their operationalization to 
this veto right or add a diverse set of additional parliamentary competences. Similarly, there is 
a consensus that “influence” of parliaments on security policy is an important variable and that 
parliamentary influence is more than voting down government proposals. Yet there is no 
agreement on how to operationalize and measure parliamentary influence. Secondly, studies 
that seek to establish causal relations and to demonstrate parliamentary influence usually rely 
on correlational evidence. Experimental methods or qualitative process-tracing that could 
assess causal relations are almost never used.   
Moving Beyond the State of the Art 
This special issue aims to move this state of research forward in two ways. For one, there is 
widespread acknowledgment that looking at structural features like constitutional rules or 
ideational factors like the party composition of parliament does not suffice to understand how 
legislative-executive relations play out in the security realm. Rather there are informal and 
contextual factors that also shape the ability of parliament to influence government. One set of 
contributions to this special issue, therefore, explores such factors in more detail. Secondly, the 
focus on parliaments as constraints on government has left other areas of parliamentary 
involvement in security policy unexplored. In particular, the effects of parliamentary 
involvement have received little attention and a number of the contributions to this special issue 
seek to address these effects more systematically. This includes, on the one hand, the effects 
parliaments have on security policy (does parliamentary involvement contribute to more 
peaceful policies?). On the other hand, parliaments can also have effects on the politics of 
security and especially on public debate (does parliamentary involvement contribute to the 
politicization of security? Does it enhance public deliberation?). In addressing these questions, 
the special issue also seeks to demonstrate the merits of using a diverse set of methods from 
survey experiments to quantitative analyses and within-case comparisons. 
Informal sources of parliamentary influence on government  
Previous studies have done much to clarify how structural factors shape the opportunities for 
parliaments to influence governmental policy. Yet the relation between government and 
parliament is not determined by constitutional rules or party affiliations alone. Both sides can 
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seek to reinforce, soften or overwrite constraints on parliamentary influence. On a general level, 
this has already been acknowledged for the side of parliaments. In their often-cited distinction 
of the “3 A’s”, Born and Hänggi (2005, 2004) argue that opportunities for parliament to affect 
security policy result not only from its formal legal rights (“authority”). Rather, parliament’s 
capability to become involved effectively (“ability”, as in parliamentary resources like budget, 
staff, and infrastructure) and MPs’ willingness to conduct effective oversight (“attitude”) are 
important conditions as well.  
There are some cases that can serve as obvious evidence that parliamentarians can create 
opportunities to influence executive policies even when they do not possess strong formal rights 
to do so. The most prominent and intensely studied case certainly has been the informal veto of 
the British House of Commons against military involvement in Syria in August 2013 (Kaarbo 
and Kenealy, 2016; Lagassé, 2017; Mello, 2017a; Strong, 2015a, 2015b). By refusing to support 
military action against the Syrian government, British MPs not only influenced government 
policy but even changed the rules of parliamentary involvement for the future. While 
parliament’s legal and constitutional authority may have remained unchanged by the Syria vote 
(Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016), it contributed to the emergence of a new convention. For some, 
this new convention implies that “Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war” (Strong, 
2015b) even though its exact shape remains contested (Mello, 2017a).4 Members of the 
European Parliament (EP) have proven especially skilled in eliciting additional powers as the 
EP has gained most of its competences (not only in the security realm) by stubbornly insisting 
that it was entitled to them and by making strategic use of its position in the policy process to 
continuously expand its own role (Riddervold and Rosén, 2016). On the other hand, where 
parliamentarians lack the will or ability to assert their preferences or make their voices heard, 
even strong constitutional powers will not lead to parliamentary involvement and influence. In 
Belgium, parliament has recently gained increased involvement in military deployment matters, 
but MPs have not succeeded to translate this into tangible influence, as noted by Reykers and 
Fonck (2015). 5 
Similar considerations also hold for government. Even when parliaments enjoy participatory 
competences, governments can try to side-line them in concrete decisions. Raunio and Wagner 
(2017: 9) argue that, despite a seeming trend towards parliamentarisation of foreign policy, the 
executive still enjoys informational advantages over parliaments in this realm, which put it in a 
privileged position. In fact, there are cases in which governments successfully shut out 
parliamentarians from decision-making even though parliament arguably was entitled to 
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participate. In Germany, for example, several smaller military deployments have been 
retroactively ruled improper by the constitutional court because the executive did not hold a 
vote in the Bundestag before authorizing operations.6 In the United States, the conflict between 
President and Congress about the legal status of the War Powers Resolution also illustrates the 
ability of governments to constrain parliamentary participation in decision-making. In Spain, 
government has repeatedly circumvented parliament when prolonging or modifying the 
mandate of ongoing operations, which sparked protest by parliamentarians (Wagner, et al., 
2017: 34). Österdahl (2011) notes that, in Sweden, parliament may be formally involved in 
decisions on the use of force but parliamentary procedures often merely amount to the execution 
of policies “formed elsewhere”. 
Another strategy is for governments to use external pressure to undermine meaningful 
parliamentary participation. The German government, for example, has in some cases agreed 
internationally to contribute German troops to multinational operations, effectively “tying its 
own hands” (Schelling, 1960) before asking for parliamentary approval. MPs then felt obligated 
to agree to those commitments to prevent undermining the multinational operation and the 
country’s standing on the international stage (Wagner, 2011). In Britain, the Cameron 
government decided to initiate military action over Libya several days before holding a vote in  
the House of Commons (Mello, 2017a). Yet governments may occasionally also wish to involve 
parliament in such decisions, even if they are not legally required to do so. This will happen 
most often in the hope that it will reduce opposition and secure support in the long run. Tony 
Blair’s decision to hold a vote on British participation in the Iraq War in 2003 (Strong, 2015b: 
608-10), Ronald Reagan’s decision to accept a Congress Resolution concerning the Lebanon 
intervention in 1983 (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007: 131) and the decision of Canada’s 
Conservative government to hold votes on the Afghanistan deployment in 2006 and 2008 
(Lagassé and Mello, 2018) illustrate this logic. 
Parliamentary influence, moreover, is not restricted to formal parliamentary decisions. It can 
work in ways that are not immediately apparent. Cases where parliament vetoes a government 
decision are only the most visible instances of such influence. But they are also extremely rare, 
especially in parliamentary systems. That such cases are exceptional, however, does not imply 
that parliaments are ineffective in the making of security policy. Rosén and Raube (2018), in 
their contribution to this special issue employ a classification originated by Russell and Cowley 
(2016) to argue that parliaments can become influential in every phase of the policy-making 
process from agenda-setting to evaluation. Parliamentarians may, through questions, debates, 
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hearings, public statements or behind-the-scenes bargaining and arguing, exert influence on 
much more than just the decision to send troops abroad. They may also affect (a) the framing 
of a situation as a crisis or as relevant for security policy; (b) the formulation of policy 
alternatives that are taken into consideration before a decision is made; (c) the frames through 
which ongoing operations are perceived by the public; or (d) the “lessons learnt” from a 
completed operation, which will inform future decisions. 
Parliamentary influence that flows from formal competences and becomes apparent in official 
parliamentary decisions is thus the most straightforward type of influence to detect, but not the 
only form in which influence can materialize. Those other forms of influence and their sources, 
however, are not yet well understood. This special issue seeks to contribute to such an 
understanding. 
Comparing effects of parliamentary involvement on government policies  
Given the literature’s predominant focus on legislative-executive relations, there is an obvious 
tendency to look at the effects of parliamentary involvement primarily in terms of effects on 
the policies of individual governments. We propose two ways in which this could be usefully 
expanded. First, by focusing more strongly on the comparison of policy effects across different 
cases, which would produce more generalizable results: Does parliamentary involvement make 
a difference across countries for how governments act?  
Exploring these effects will contribute directly to the study of the democratic peace. Are 
differences in the conflict behaviour of democracies rooted in variation of the ways in which 
parliaments can participate in decision-making? The studies by Dieterich, Hummel and 
Marschall (Dieterich et al., 2009; 2015) and by Mello (2012) represent important contributions 
to answering this question. Taken together, they demonstrate how a combination of sceptical 
public opinion, strong parliamentary war powers and party constellations in parliament and 
government can contribute to military restraint. In line with these findings, Haesebrouck (2016) 
shows that a causal condition for military involvement against Daesh was the absence of 
parliamentary war powers.  
Yet, there is also reason to caution against overly optimistic conclusions about a probable 
pacifying effect of parliamentary involvement. Even for the Iraq War – which should be a most-
likely case for the parliamentary peace because citizens were strongly opposed to the war – we 
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see that several democratic parliaments explicitly authorized military participation. Apart from 
the United States, this happened in Bulgaria, Denmark, and the Baltic countries, to name just a 
few examples where parliaments enjoyed veto rights, the public was opposed to the war, and 
countries nonetheless participated militarily in Iraq (Mello, 2014: 172). Moreover, it appears 
that the parliamentary peace mechanism does not apply to certain military operations, such as 
missions conducted within alliance frameworks (see Wagner, 2018). To complicate matters 
further, parliamentary veto rights often, but not always, coincide with constitutional restrictions 
on the use of force and a political culture of military restraint (Mello, 2014). This makes it 
challenging to isolate the effect of parliamentary war powers because outcomes might as well 
have been the result of firm constitutional restrictions or a restrained foreign policy culture. 
Expanding this kind of research in terms of operations, countries covered, and accounting for 
plausible alternative explanations is an obvious next step for consolidating knowledge about 
the effects of parliamentary influence and checking whether the results are generalizable. 
Effects of parliamentary involvement on the politics of security 
There are other potential effects of parliamentary involvement that go beyond immediate policy 
impact. By zeroing in on legislative-executive relations, research has lost sight of the fact that 
parliaments have other functions than directly constraining governments. Most importantly, 
they also represent, and contribute to, the public debate of policies. Their impact on public 
debates or, more broadly, on the politics of security, is therefore the third, and final, concern of 
this special issue: What effect does parliamentary involvement have on the politics of security? 
Answering this question can lay the groundwork for addressing important normative questions 
about parliamentary involvement in security policy. For a long time, political theorists have 
regarded political debate about foreign and security policy as problematic and argued for 
leaving this sphere to the executive as, for instance, John Locke in his Second Treatise, §147 
(Locke, 2004 [1690]). This sentiment has been shared by many decision-makers who argue that 
“partisan politics stops at the water’s edge” (a claim attributed to US Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg) because the pursuit of national security requires national unity.  
On the other hand, democratic theory today emphasizes the general need for public debate and 
public justification and sees an extension of this debate into the security sphere as generally 
beneficial. Deliberative theories of democracy hold that democratically legitimate policies 
require public justification and deliberation. Arguably, parliaments have a particularly 
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important place in such processes. As “strong publics”, they combine public deliberation of 
policies in a representative forum with the power to make binding decisions (Brunkhorst, 2002; 
Fraser, 1990: 75). In contrast to other forums for public debate, parliaments “link justification 
on the one hand with public control and political equality on the other” (Lord, 2011: 1141). In 
a similar vein, scholars of the Copenhagen School advocate the de-securitization of political 
issues; that is to say, moving issues from the sphere of security into the sphere of public debate 
(see Behnke, 2013: 55-9). Even though this is rarely spelled out explicitly, parliamentary 
procedures can provide an avenue for such de-securitization as they provide for a slowing down 
of political processes and offer the opportunity for open contestation of executive policies by 
the opposition. 
At the heart of such arguments in favour of including parliaments into decision-making about 
security thus lies in their role as forums for debate, contestation and justification. Empirically, 
however, it is unclear whether the inclusion of parliaments in the making of security policy has 
this effect. On the one hand, having parliaments debate security policy may well lead to a 
politicization of security which extends partisan politics beyond the water’s edge. It can put the 
executive under pressure to justify its policies publicly and provide room for the opposition to 
test the government’s arguments and seek public support for its own position. Yet there may 
just as well be the contrary effect: that the logic of security is extended to the parliamentary 
realm. Consequently, parliamentary debate might become subdued in the security sphere and 
political parties may feel the pressure to demonstrate national unity vis-à-vis potential security 
threats. This, however, is an issue that can be settled only through empirical investigation and, 
therefore, this special issue includes contributions which examine the levels of politicization 
and debate in parliaments when security issues are concerned.   
Contribution of the Special Issue 
The articles assembled for this special issue can be grouped along these three guiding questions. 
Each of them tackles one particular question, but many of them speak to other questions as well. 
The first group of articles identifies opportunities for parliamentary influence on security policy 
that result from informal sources. Strong (2018) revisits the debate about parliamentary war 
powers in Britain. He demonstrates the flexibility of constitutional rules by examining the new 
convention about parliamentary participation in decisions about troop deployments and 
exploring the areas where this convention remains open to interpretation. The inherent 
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vagueness of the convention ultimately gives government a role in deciding whether to bring 
in or shut out parliament from decisions about troop deployments. Strong examines the 
incentives government has in such situations. Governments will weigh the likelihood of 
winning a vote and the political costs of circumventing parliament. Misperceptions may lead to 
miscalculations and eventually to defeat in parliament, as illustrated by the House of Commons 
Syria vote. While Strong’s argument may be particularly applicable to the British case with its 
convention-based constitutional system, it serves as a reminder that formal rules are rarely 
unequivocal and always need interpretation. This creates openings for other interested actors to 
enable or constrain parliamentary involvement. It also underlines that the executive might 
occasionally be interested in having parliament participate to share political responsibility and 
enhance the legitimacy of military operations.  
Kaarbo (2018) takes this a step further and zeroes in on the role of one executive agent, the 
Prime Minister, in shaping the role of parliament. She shares the argument that formal 
constraints need to be activated before they become effective and argues that personality traits 
of the government leader can help explain why some are more inclined to allow or encourage 
parliamentary involvement than others. She uses Leadership Trait Analysis as an established 
toolset to develop hypotheses about the link between Prime Ministers’ personalities and the role 
they allow for parliament and uses the cases of Britain and Turkey to illustrate their plausibility.  
The other contributions in this section turn their eyes on parliament rather than the executive 
and examine in how far parliamentarians themselves might be able to extend their influence 
beyond formal constraints. Kriner (2018) argues that even when the executive has been able to 
circumvent the legislature in deploying troops, MPs can still constrain it indirectly by 
influencing public opinion. He demonstrates how statements by US Congressmen/women can 
affect public opinion about the use of force in concrete cases. As executives are well-advised 
to ensure public support for military operations, speaking directly to the public creates 
opportunities for parliamentarians to influence policy indirectly even for parliaments with weak 
formal competences. By using a survey experiment to test his claims, he goes beyond 
correlational analysis and demonstrates the causal influence that statements by 
Congressmen/women have on public opinion.   
Rosén and Raube (2018), in contrast, examine opportunities that parliamentarians can create 
within parliamentary procedures. They explore ways in which the members of the European 
Parliament (EP) have managed to extend their influence over EU security policies. The EP is 
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usually conceived as particularly powerless in security policy but it has found several ways to 
exert influence at various stages of the decision-making process. Similarly, as Kriner, Rosén 
and Raube emphasize that parliamentarians can influence policies without actually co-deciding 
on them and argue that research needs to take into account the full policy process from agenda-
setting to the evaluation of policies to identify avenues of parliamentary influence. Moreover, 
they demonstrate how members of the EP utilized their competences in other areas to gain 
leverage over security policies in those various stages.  
Schade (2018) stays with European security policy but shows how the multilateralization of 
security policy also opens up new opportunities for national parliaments. Where previous 
research had taken the multilateral character of deployments into account at all, it had usually 
depicted it as a challenge and a problem for national parliaments which were argued to be the 
losers of the extant two-level games dynamics (e.g. Born and Hänggi, 2004). Schade, however, 
demonstrates that, in the case of the EU, there are often additional scrutiny mechanisms 
available to national parliaments. These had been created to allow for national parliamentary 
scrutiny of the EU's legislative activities. They can, however, be employed in the security realm 
as well to enhance the flow of information from the European level to national parliaments. 
This can improve their position in the two-level game of EU security policy. His analysis of 
three parliaments and three EU operations demonstrates also, however, that the existence of 
opportunities does not imply that these are used by parliamentarians.  
Finally, Oktay (2018) adds party politics to the equation. She shows how coalition politics can 
create opportunities for small parties and for the opposition in parliament to gain leverage. 
Analysing three parliaments (Denmark, the Netherlands and Israel), she finds that coalition 
governments of different types and at different stages in their life cycles have strong incentives 
to seek support of opposition parties for their security policies. The result is logrolling. The 
opposition parties take the opportunity to extract concessions in other policy areas in exchange 
for their support of important decisions in the security realm.  
What emerges from these contributions is a view of legislative-executive relations in the 
security realm that is much more dynamic than a focus on parliamentary competences and the 
partisan composition of parliament alone might suggest. The “strength” or “weakness” of 
parliaments in each situation appears, to a considerable degree, a matter of negotiation between 
parliamentarians and the executive. Both sides can employ a variety of resources in these 
interactions and parliamentary competences and party coherence are only two such assets.  
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That formal competences are important but not all-encompassing is also reflected in the 
contribution that tackles the second of our guiding questions. What is the effect of parliamentary 
involvement on security policies of democracies? Wagner (2018) examines the question 
whether stronger parliamentary participation rights reduce involvement in military operations. 
To find a generalizable answer, he considerably extends the scope of earlier studies and 
examines the (non-)participation of all NATO members and Partnership for Peace countries in 
five military operations. His results provide modest support for a “parliamentary peace” but 
also show the importance of contextual factors like the type of mission. For some operations, 
countries with weak parliamentary participation rights are indeed more likely to participate. 
This is not true, however, for two of the operations he examines, Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan and the Iraq War. In explaining this difference between operations, he highlights 
the conditioning effects of international circumstances, whereas previous research has shown 
that domestic factors, like public opinion and government ideology, condition the link between 
parliamentary competences and participation in military operations. Wagner argues that the 
international framing of an operation as a test for alliance solidarity can restrain the effect of 
parliamentary veto power.  
Lagassé and Mello (2018) explore the “unintended consequences” of parliamentary 
involvement, investigating parliamentary debates about troop deployments to Afghanistan in 
the Canadian and German legislatures. They find that involving parliaments does not 
necessarily lead to more pronounced political contestation. Rather, there are incentives for party 
elites to collude, to organize large majorities in favour of operations and thus to suppress 
politicization, especially once troops have been sent abroad. 
This leads to the final set of articles, which focuses on the effect of parliamentary involvement 
on the politics of security. Does parliamentary involvement result in the politicization of 
security or is security treated differently from other policy areas in parliament and political 
debate is muted? In his study of the Finnish Eduskunta, Raunio (2018) concludes that 
politicization of security does occur in parliamentary proceedings but that it does so especially 
in times of political change. When strategic change was discussed in the Finnish parliament, 
security issues grew more salient and diverse political opinions were articulated. But this 
politicization appeared to subside over time and it appears to have created a consensus about 
the desirability of both crisis management and parliamentary involvement, which makes 
today’s debates about individual deployments generally less controversial. This resonates with 
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the findings of Lagassé and Mello (2018), as they examine two countries where general debates 
about whether and how to use the armed forces after the Cold War have diminished as of late.  
Hegemann (2018), finally, extends the search for effects of parliamentary involvement in 
security in two ways. His study, first, puts this nascent strand of research in a broader context 
and links it to research about securitization. Secondly, he extends the concept of security policy 
and examines the politicization not of military deployments but of the oversight of intelligence 
agencies. Hegemann shows for the German case that recent intelligence scandals have led to 
increased public deliberation and political contestation in a policy area that is traditionally 
dominated by notions of consensus and confidentiality. 
Hence, political contestation is not a matter of course once security issues become the subject 
of parliamentary procedures. But such procedures offer an opportunity for politicization when 
issues are salient. Taken together, the contributions by Hegemann, Raunio and Lagassé/Mello 
demonstrate the cross-cutting pressures at work in parliaments that debate security policy. To 
some degree, we indeed see politicization introduced through parliamentary involvement. This 
appears to concern foremost questions that are judged to be of strategic relevance, however. 
Once the big decisions have been made, MPs have less incentive to question them afterwards, 
especially if they had made these decisions themselves. This pattern holds for both debates 
about military operations and intelligence oversight. This shows that insights from the study of 
military security issues may be extendable to broader security issues and that comparing the 
two areas may provide another useful avenue for future research. 
Conclusion 
This special issue focuses on the often neglected role that the pivotal democratic institution – 
parliament – plays in security policy. This introduction and the individual articles are structured 
along three analytical angles, focusing on parliamentary involvement in security policy, the 
politicization of security matters, and parliamentary influence on policy outcomes. While the 
contributions share a focus on the questions developed in the introduction, they are 
methodologically and empirically diverse, including case studies, experiments, as well as 
statistical analyses, and drawing on eleven different parliamentary bodies and cross-national 
data on parliaments from 34 countries. 
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Our focus on parliaments shows what is peculiar about the security policies of democracies. 
These policies need to be publicly justified and parliament provides an institution that is 
designed as a forum for such justification and for holding executives to account over their 
policies. The cases discussed in this collection amply demonstrate that parliamentarians seek to 
fulfill this task also in the security realm and that they do have opportunities to debate and 
contribute to decision-making in this issue area.  
Even though these opportunities may generally be structured by their constitutional 
competences and by party affiliations, the contributions also make it clear that legislative-
executive relations in this realm are flexible and dynamic. They are managed by both members 
of parliament and members of the executive and the success of parliamentarians in making their 
voices heard depends on several informal and situational factors, including personality traits of 
the government leader and the aptitude of actors on both sides in exploiting opportunities 
resulting, for example, from coalition dynamics, their competences in other areas, or their 
exposure to the media. This does not imply that parliaments necessarily pose strong immediate 
constraints for government action. Their effects may be minimized by international pressure 
and the level of contestation of security policies in parliamentary procedures appears to be 
limited, especially once strategic decisions have been made.  
Pursuing these insights further promises to be beneficial for research both on international 
relations and on comparative politics. For democratic peace research, a focus on processes of 
public justification and their institutional underpinning in parliaments will not only help to 
better understand what democracies have in common and what may inhibit them from going to 
war with each other. It also points to differences between them that may help to explain the 
differences in their conflict behaviour vis-à-vis non-democracies. Comparative politics and 
legislative studies can employ the insights to extend their reach into a policy area they have 
paid less attention to and in which the level of politicization may be less pronounced than in 
other policy areas. Scholars interested in the democratization of security policy and decision-
makers themselves may be interested in learning about the broad inventory of tools and assets 
that exist for parliamentarians to seek influence on what was long regarded as an executive 
domain. It is our hope that this special issue sheds light on these issues, which we are just 
beginning to understand, and encourages further research along these lines. 
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Notes
1  For recent overviews on democratic peace research, see Geis and Wagner (2008), Hayes 
(2011), and Mello (2017b). On legislative studies, see the contributions in Martin et al. 
(2014).  
2  See also the individual contributions to a recent special issue of West European Politics 
(Raunio and Wagner, 2017). We do not argue that this rising research interest indicates 
an empirical trend towards the empowerment of parliaments in the security realm 
(comparable, for example, to parliamentary empowerment in EU affairs (Winzen et al., 
2015). While there have been claims about a trend towards the parliamentarization of 
security policy (Damrosch, 1995), the empirical evidence in terms of formal 
parliamentary competences across countries and time is mixed (Peters and Wagner, 
2011). Rather, we are concerned with better understanding the role of parliaments in 
security policy, which can serve as a basis for judging whether or not parliaments are 
becoming more empowered de facto. 
3  In line with this focus, most of the contributions to this special issue deal with 
parliamentary involvement in military operations. Nonetheless, the collection also 
contains one article on intelligence oversight (Hegemann, 2018) that extends the scope to 
broader issues of security policy and that serves to demonstrate what can be gained from 
comparing insights about military security issues with issues of domestic security. 
4  On parliamentary war powers in Britain, see also the contribution by Strong (2018) in this 
special issue. McCormack (2016) notes that the new convention of mandatory 
parliamentary approval does not apply to “warfare by remote control” (especially the use 
of drones), which has become a prominent element in Western military action. 
5  On the role of parliamentarians in negotiation delegations, see Onderco (2017). 
6  See the contribution by Lagassé and Mello (2018) in this special issue. 
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